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“Trust” or likewise “confidence” (the term preferred in this paper) are notions which have received
considerable attention by economists in the last 8-10 years. In this contribution, much emphasis is
put on the understanding what we really mean by “confidence”, what the differences between opti-
mism and confidence are and how the onset of confidence can possibly be explained. Also, we
analyze the economic effects of a lack of or the erosion of confidence. The paper intends to provide
a comprehensive view on the major effects of confidence on economic growth, the business cycle,
its relation to income distribution, etc. Finally, the contribution of confidence to social capital is
discussed and the erosion of confidence within, between and towards business enterprises as a con-
sequence of the widespread scandals in the US and other industrialised countries at the beginning of
the new millennium is portrayed.
Key words:  Corporate Culture, Social Capital, Organisational Behaviour
“Vertrauen” (im Englischen: “Trust” oder auch “Confidence” ) ist ein Begriff, der sich in den letz-
ten 8 bis 10 Jahren auch unter Ökonomen einer bemerkenswerten Aufmerksamkeit erfreut. In die-
sem Beitrag wird Vertrauen zunächst als ökonomisches Erfahrungs- und Erkenntnisobjekt vorge-
stellt. Anschließend diskutieren wir u. a. die Unterschiede zwischen Vertrauen und Optimismus und
wie man sich das „erstmalige“ Herausbilden von Vertrauen unter ökonomischen Akteuren vorstel-
len kann. Auch betrachten wir die ökonomischen Funktionen und Effekte eines Mangels oder einer
Erosion von Vertrauen. Der Beitrag versucht, die wesentlichen ökonomischen Auswirkungen des
Vertrauens auf das Wirtschaftswachstum, den Konjunkturzyklus, die Einkommensverteilung, etc.
systematisch abzuhandeln. Schließlich widmen wir der Frage breiten Raum, welchen Beitrag das
Vertrauen zum sogenannten Sozialkapital zu leisten vermag und porträtieren die Erosion von Ver-
trauen innerhalb, zwischen und gegenüber US-amerikanischen Firmen in Folge der weitreichenden
Finanzskandale zu Beginn des neuen Millenniums.
Schlagworte: Unternehmenskultur, Sozialkapital, Organisationsforschung
JEL-Klassifikation: M14, D69, D23Confidence and the Erosion of Confidence 2
“The essence of market economy is that it involves
countless economic exchange transactions. Mutual
confidence is what many of those transactions are
about. An individual lends money to another individual,
relying on that person to return it. This confidence is
based on the legal system. If a person fails to meet
contractual obligations, there are means to enforce
them.“ (Stiglitz 2002, p. 191).
1 Introduction
1
Regardless of the level, business administrators and economists in the past eight years have shown
an increasing interest in a category pertaining to the field of psychology, namely “confidence”, or
likewise “trust”. Among other factors, this is because an important monograph on this subject writ-
ten by F. Fukuyama was published in 1995. It does not reduce the importance of a much earlier
work by Luhmann on the same topic which was brought out in 1973. It is an indication, though, as
to the numbers of readers which scientific works written in German reach on an international level.
However, a single scientific volume, as important as it may be, goes only that far in explaining the
“boom” that confidence is experiencing in the field of economics. It is to no small degree the prog-
ress made in communication and information technology that has given “confidence” a significantly
increased status in the working world. Certainly, it may be considered an undisputed fact that “con-
fidence” needs to be counted among the essential cultural elements and fundamentals of an econ-
omy and society. On the other hand, it has not been fully explained so far what the economic di-
mensions of this term are and how to identify the benefits accruing to (or costs incurred by) the
individual business enterprise and society as a whole as a result of the existence or nonexistence or
erosion of confidence. This treatise is intended to contribute to that goal.
2  Confidence as an Object of Experience
The interest economists take in “confidence” is nothing new; however, it has been greatly revived in
the past years, as was stated above. There are several “real” reasons for this. The following might be
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the most important ones: On the one hand, the modern working world has changed at a rapid pace,
and teleworking, E-mail, virtual enterprises, networks, video conferencing and other aspects of
communication technology (CT) and information technology (IT) have profoundly changed the
“traditional” relationships – if they ever existed, that is – with the workplace, with coworkers, and
with superiors. In many ways (though not in every way, as will be explained below) the direct, per-
sonal and thus interactive contact between acting individuals has become weaker. If you watch
commuters on a platform at the train station in the morning, you will see people standing around
silently or busily talking on their mobile phones, but rarely communicating with each other. At the
same time, though, the need for “confidence”, for “confidence in relationships” has not diminished,
but rather has increased. This is not surprising: The less we are able to verify or control the behav-
iour of coworkers, subordinates, etc. through our own presence, the more we seek to be able to rely
on fairness, continuity and reliability.
As Reinermann (2002, p. 169) stated, the most essential feature created by IT, the Internet, “has
brought about a large number of innovations which are based on the transparent communication
between individuals equal in rank, and quite pointedly not so on hierarchical control.” This is an
important issue, because at least since Fukuyama, if not earlier, there have been assumptions that
there might be an important connection between hierarchy (forms and strengths of hierarchy) on the
one hand and confidence on the other. We will come back to that later. Moreover, with IT and CT
came a decisive change for the people (Reinermann 2002, p. 167): The requirement for them to stay
at a particular location (“fixed network“, “PC workstation”) has diminished dramatically. Presuma-
bly, this also causes an increased demand for confidence, or at least for reliability. For frequent
changes of location make people increasingly dependent on the “functioning” of their own envi-
ronment, which is subject to change.
The above quotation from Stiglitz (2002) intends to draw conclusions from mere observation and/or
experience during the economic transformation process, and it points at one important partial aspect
of trust: as empirical studies (Zak/Knack 2001, p. 311) found out, “trust increases with formal in-
stitutions”, among other things. This is so because formal institutions tend to building trust (ibid.,
p. 316). Why? A proxy for formal institutions is “contract enforceability” (ibid.). Hence, the exis-
tence of formal institutions elevates the likelihood (“trust”) to see legal norms respected. But this is
not exactly what we mean by trust: “people may trust each other only for fear of legal punishment.
If this were the case, then the effect of trust would simply be a reinterpretation of the role played by
legal enforcement” (Guiso et al., 2001, p. 6). Moreover, because “legal enforcement is a substitute
of trust” (ibid., p. 26), people are in special need to put confidence in other persons when there are
no legal systems and no formal mechanisms to enforce obligations.Confidence and the Erosion of Confidence 4
3  Confidence as an Object of Recognition
Therefore, one might argue in this vein that “confidence” may be dispensed with if relationships
between the parties involved can be regulated through contractual provisions, with the agreed (im-
plicit or explicit) contractual penalties acting as the enforcers of such provisions. The new institu-
tional economics (Richter/Furubotn 1999) and especially the formal theory of contracts have devel-
oped a whole array of elegant, mathematically sophisticated models over the past 20 years that
demonstrate which are the conditions that have to be met to make the incentive compatibility of
contracts on all sides big enough for the parties to expect that the contractual provisions will be met.
Most recently, however, there have been contributions – such as from the principal agent theory or
from the economics of transaction costs – which, generally speaking, deal with those very situations
in which the parties involved deliberately make do without a contract, wishing to get involved with
their counterparts, and even desiring to have confidence in them. Explanations have been offered
not only by the new institutional economics but also by game theory (Demougin 1999, Albert
1999), by organisational psychology (Bissels 2002) and other sub-disciplines of economics such as
the economic research of business cycles (Sell 2002a). What has come from all this? All have con-
tributed to the phenomenon, but in the end you ask yourself mainly one thing: Did I learn some-
thing about “confidence” or rather something about “cooperation”, “credibility”, “reputation”,
“transparency”, etc.? Time and again the attempt has been made to use possible surrogates to make
“confidence” a tangible thing. We have to ask the critical question as to why the economists, being
the representatives of a behavioural science, do not want to become more adept at observing and
listening. This is another reason for why there is a need for an in-depth economic analysis of the
phenomenon of confidence. As is generally known, the recently deceased German philosopher
Hans-Georg Gadamer defined hermeneutics in its entirety as the art of listening (or of being able to
listen), for even our everyday language is full of confidence relations that show us the way to eco-
nomic understanding.
4  Confidence Results from Investments and Becomes a Production
Factor
In the German language, there are known figures of speech such as jemandem einen Vertrauensvor-
schuß geben (literally: “to give someone an advance payment of confidence”); under the best of
circumstances you may Vertrauen schenken (“to present someone with your confidence”), or you
may choose the more cautious variant of Vertrauen in jemanden setzen (“put your confidence in
someone”). In doing so, we often accept the fact that this makes us vulnerable (Luhmann 1973).
Conversely, we would like to “win” the confidence of our counterpart. This we do, for example, by4  Confidence Results from Investments and Becomes a Production Factor 5
taking “confidence-building measures” (a term that was readily used during the Cold War era and
also during the initial OSCE conferences). From an economic perspective, all of these verbs are
flows that symbolise nothing but an investment (even including a “lost” advance payment that we
actually have no intention to retrieve) or an “invitation” extended to our counterpart to do precisely
that, i.e. to make such an investment. If the investment “pays off” for us, that is if it shows a posi-
tive internal rate of interest, we are willing to repeat it. This is exactly where the game theory finds
justification – trust can be built among players if they play only tit-for-tat in a repeated prisoner’s
dilemma (La Porta et al. 1997, p. 333) – and why Berg et al. (1995, p. 123) can talk about “invest-
ment games”. We may well agree with Ripperger (1998) in that confidence is about fairly risky
investments intended to stabilise uncertain expectations or to reduce behavioural risks or, more gen-
erally, to reduce uncertainties and the complexities of social actions (Bissels 2002), which in the
end comes down to risk reduction. However, this concept needs to be thought through: If it is cor-
rect that a market economy needs the Schumpeterian entrepreneur, who is characterised by the fact
that he is willing to take ever new risks (in new markets, with new products or procedures), then it
becomes also clear what the correlation is that exists between confidence and risk. Confidence cre-
ates additional room to move for the Schumpeterian entrepreneur. Consequently, confidence and
risk do not compete but complement each other. The pioneering entrepreneur may, if other sectors
within his business enterprise are “secured” by a sound foundation of confidence, invest his “ven-
ture capital” – H.-W. Sinn (1986) called it the production factor 'risk' – in those areas where amor-
tisation is particularly high, such as in future-oriented sectors. Therefore, confidence not only makes
it possible to reduce certain risks but also to create a more clear-cut risk profile of entrepreneurs.
As is well known, continued investments will result in capital formation. Accordingly, confidence
now has the character of a stock (“I do have his confidence”) or, to be more specific, that of an ac-
cumulable production factor, such as is frequently used in the modern theory of growth. In this,
reciprocity plays the major role: After all, the actual goal is to “have confidence in each other”
(flow) and, finally, to deal with each other “in mutual confidence” (stock). The returns of our own
investments correlate positively with our counterpart’s investment returns.
2 It follows that confi-
dence must not be confused with “cooperation”, for even in a cartel there must be cooperation, for
good or worse, and yet nobody would harbour the rather absurd idea that confidence between the
parties involved might be what this cooperation is based on. If my counterpart had no confidence in
me, my own confidence in him would not amount to much in the long run. Here, the difference to
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“credibility” becomes clearly visible. As opposed to confidence, credibility is – initially – a one-
sided phenomenon: While you can indeed lose it, you can never give it.
Admittedly, the two do have some points in common. When taking as a basis Luhmann’s appropri-
ate differentiation between personal confidence and what is called “confidence in the system”, such
as we (can) have towards institutions like a central bank, this kind of confidence in the system may
dwindle at a rapid pace because of opportunistic practices, such as in monetary or exchange rate
policy. A grave loss of confidence (in this case meaning: confidence in the foreign currency) liter-
ally cuts the ground for risky decisions from under the feet of entrepreneurs in a way that bars them
from taking such decisions. In the process, it is completely irrelevant whether the observed willing-
ness to take risks is exogenous (risk-love ex-ante) or endogenous, for example, as a function of
governmental guarantee-related behaviour. Can, for example, confidence in a currency be meas-
ured? Yes in principle it can; the following calculus is rather simple, even though one may draw on
economic relations which are quite elementary and therefore resilient, too:
Relative (stochastic) purchasing power parity:
(1)  )   , 0 ( ; ˆ 2 σ ε ε π π ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ + + + + − − − − = = = = a i E
Interest rate determination according to Irving Fisher
(2) 
e
i i i i r π − − − − = = = =
(3) 
e
a a a i r π − − − − = = = =
Subtracting (3) from (2) gives:
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(6) 
e
a i a i E i i r r ˆ − − − − − − − − = = = = − − − −
The arbitrage condition requires:  0 = = = = − − − − a i r r  and therefore (6) results in:
(7) 
e
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Consequently, at a given foreign interest rate the expected rate of depreciation of the domestic cur-
rency becomes lower as the domestic interest rate falls
3. But the greater the confidence in a cur-
rency is, the lower the expected rate of depreciation becomes: “Depreciation of the exchange value
of a national currency as the result of loss of confidence by investors in the currency of a country
pursuing unsustainable policies …“ (Schwarz 2002, p. 459). Currency depreciation, hence signals in
turn a loss of policy credibility, a fact which Knack and Keefer (1997, p. 1266) found in their
econometric experiments where the coefficients for trust fell, when currency depreciation was
added to the regressions.
However, a “credulous audience” will not demand from an economic institution that it should im-
plement its announcements down to the last letter and at any given time (just think of the German
Bundesbank’s target zone for M3). Goal violations are accepted inasmuch and as long as compen-
sating action is taken that may be interpreted as a “timely reversal”. What is decisive is that the
promised results do materialise in the medium and long term (Maaß/Sell 1998). Otherwise, there is
a loss of confidence, which goes along with a loss of credibility. “Reputation” (Ripperger 1998)
then would be the public information as to the “credibility” of an acting individual or institution.
Luhmann’s analysis of trust in institutions helps us to make a further differentiation: the erosion of
confidence is much worth than lack of confidence, simply because the good taste of trust could al-
ready be felt earlier. We tend to miss those things we already enjoyed before much more than un-
known panaceas. More precisely, institutions like central banks can confirm that a lack of confi-
dence among the public leaves them with the expensive option of the “taking the medicine” strategy
(Sell 2001, pp. 129-156). However, the erosion of confidence means to them that the cheaper “fix-
ing” or “cheating strategies” are out of reach in the first place. If the purpose is to overcome the
erosion of confidence, they may be left with the “regaining reputation” strategy which is by far the
most expensive one (ibid.).
“I am confident that I can do it” – what does this colloquial, often-heard phrase stand for? We may
safely assume that it does mean that a person is willing to take risks. By slightly altering the phrase
into “I have confidence in myself”, we can easily see that it is also about confidence – or trust – in
one’s own abilities. Obviously, this is the very precondition for being willing to take risks, for it is
the very essence of economic risk that a business decision may result in a future profit but just as
well in a loss. To be confident in one’s own is an attitude which apparently has its links to the no-
tion of optimism. Here, there is some confusion of terms in the literature.
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5  Optimism vs. Confidence
In the framework of game theory “trust” or “confidence” is modelled and/or interpreted for example
as a particular subjective probability assigned by the principal in the event that the agent imple-
ments the required level of input, care etc., which is the action desired by the principal (Demougin
1999, p. 305). Both players find themselves in an agency relationship characterised by “moral haz-
ard and adverse selection” (ibid., p. 303) and can be taken to be risk-neutral. It is typical for such a
game to find a trade-off for the cheating strategy of the agent; on the one hand the direct (short-
term) gain of cheating may exceed the rent of implementing the required input but, on the other
hand at the (long-term) risk that the game ends. Hence ex-ante, it is not clear whether the expected
present value of cheating dominates vis-à-vis implementing.
As we have explained, players are – excluding exceptions – more often not in an agency relation-
ship, but confronted with game situations of a Kydland/Prescott/Barro/Gordon world. What sort of
meaning can trust or confidence have here? Obviously, confidence has to be linked to the issue of
expectations. According to the view put forward by Maaß and Sell (1998, p. 520), confidence or
likewise confident expectations, can persist even if an institution like a central bank dares to cheat
the public as long as cheating is regarded only as a transitory phenomenon and it implies “the belief
by private agents that any actual monetary target deviation by the central bank will be 'healed' by a
compensating policy in the (near) future so that the medium to long-term achievements in the field
of price stability are not put in danger” (ibid.). Yet, confidence or trust is not the opposite to scepti-
cism/pessimism (the first being some sort of weaker pessimism) as some papers tend to argue im-
plicitly, but suspiciously. Accordingly, scepticism or pessimism matches optimism (Allen/
Faulhaber 1988, p. 398).
If one would still be interested to relate the notion of confidence to the attitude of optimism, the
answer is straightforward: Contrary to the observation of confidence, where at least one individual
has to be confident in someone else, optimism (pessimism) in comparison, has to do with (the lack
of) self-confidence. In the definition of Heifetz and Spiegel (2000, pp. 1 and 2), “optimists overes-
timate the positive impact of their own actions, pessimists underestimate it, and only realists assess
it correctly”. We will come back to this judgement. Max Weber, by the way, has apparently been a
strong opponent to any “naïve” optimism among philosophers; as Hennis (2001, p. 17) reports, he
blamed some of his colleagues for their attempt to find the road to happiness and justice in science.
“Who would believe in that”, he is quoted, “only great children on their reading desk or in press
rooms” (ibid.).5  Optimism vs. Confidence 9
Another possibility to differentiate between confidence and optimism is put forward by Ripperger
(1998): As in the case of hopes, optimism is related to exogenous risks with the important implica-
tion that in principle no contract can be made with the agent who possibly triggers the uncertain
events. As opposed to this, confidence is related to endogenous risks, that is to situations where the
risk taken by some agent is dependent of the behaviour of another agent. In principle, a contract can
be signed between these two agents (ibid., p. 38). Such a contract may (but must not) be one be-
tween an agent and a principal.
A number of authors identify the attitude of optimism with the observation “that most people are
overconfident about their own relative abilities, and unreasonably optimistic about their futures”
(Camerer/Lovallo 1999, p. 306). Or, as Hvide puts it, “if (a, the author) worker is overconfident, his
confidence level exceeds his true (average) ability” (2002, p. 20). Yet, the correlation between op-
timism (pessimism) and overconfidence, is far from being clear: One may argue that it is not the
optimists who misjudge the capabilities of their adversaries, but rather the pessimists. Optimists are
not automatically “overconfident about the precision of their knowledge” (Odean 1998, p. 1888).
On the contrary, it may be that they transfer a job/task to other agents because they expect them to
do a great job. They can be optimistic about the outcome, no matter if they themselves or others will
be the acting persons. As a consequence and contrary to Heifetz and Spiegel (2000), it is definitely
not a must in the attitude of optimists to “overestimate the degree to which they were instrumental
in bringing it (the positive result, the author) about” (ibid., p. 1893).
As a result, economic agents tend to execute economic decisions – like business and/or market entry
– which, without misjudging one's own relative skills, might not have occurred. It seems as if opti-
mism comes in here as sort of illusion and/or missing realism, as the subjects concerned “seem to
neglect the fact that they are competing with a reference group of subjects who all think they are
skilled too” (ibid., p. 307). Statistically spoken, a majority of agents pretend to be above the average
in skills, although, if the trait is symmetrically distributed, only half of them can be. Optimists are
blamed for not thinking that “everybody else is thinking the same way” (ibid., p. 315). In his recent
paper, Hvide (2002, p. 22) addresses the issue of overconfidence in labour markets. In a two periods
game between firms and workers, “a moderate degree of overconfidence gives the agent the highest
expected utility” (or wage, the author). Such a moderate degree of overconfidence is labelled
“pragmatic belief”. The main force behind belief is the incentive to take into account what pays
rather than what is true (ibid., p. 24). Some overconfidence pays because the firm has to give a
higher offer in time 1 to attract the worker if he, the worker, has high expectations about future
(time 2) job offers.Confidence and the Erosion of Confidence 10
Yet, to be overconfident in the impact of one's own actions, or to overestimate the effectiveness of a
policy adoption, does not cover all aspects of optimism. There are optimists who do not act at all in
the sense of an entrepreneur or of an adviser to the policy-maker, but simply as consumers. Opti-
mism/pessimism and consumers have a lot in common. The optimism of single consumers will be
reinforced – and hence translated into a growing consumer demand on the macroeconomic level –
once the well-known bandwagon effects (Sell 1997, pp. 8-10) come into play. What has been used
to be framed “herding” in modern analysis of international financial crises (Sell 2001), has a corol-
lary in the leader-follower relationship in consumption behaviour. Bandwagon effects can work in
both directions and so contribute to understanding why consumers beliefs tend to homogenise dur-
ing both the upswing and the downswing phase of the business cycle. Burdekin and Langdana
(1995, p. 145) conclude that there is an “enhancing catalytic effect of consumer sentiment. There-
fore, fluctuations in explanatory variables that are not simultaneously accompanied by fluctuations
in sentiment, might have a disproportionately lower effect on overall economic activity”.
6 Consumers’  Confidence
The majority of papers intending to make use of indicators which could reflect consumers' beliefs,
draw on measures of so-called “consumer confidence” (Acemoglu/Scott 1994, p. 1) or “consumer
sentiment” (Delorme Jr et al. 2001, p. 864). The Gallup-Survey, for example, takes into account
(and later averages over them) responses to five questions given by consumers who were asked
about their last year experiences with “general economic conditions” and their “household fi-
nances”, the “expectations of change” in these variables over the next year and, finally about
whether “it is a good time to make a major purchase” (Acemoglu/Scott 1994, p. 3). However, com-
puting a simple average of these responses is like comparing apples with pears: Whereas having
positive (negative) expectations regarding the future in the forward looking answers reveals, by and
large, the size of optimism (pessimism) among the interviewed people, the backward looking an-
swers – and also the answer with regard to the propensity to purchase in the present – give some
hint as to what extent people were surprised (disillusioned) in the immediate past. The multidimen-
sionality of combining different attitudes with different types of errors gets lost, if one simply iden-
tifies low (high) confidence with “consumers (being) depressed (glad) and pessimistic (optimistic)
about the current state of the economy” (Delorme Jr et al. 2001, p. 866). In this simplistic view,
pessimism (optimism) is “caused” by a good (bad) expected state of the economy and it is no longer
possible to explain the business cycle as being driven by strong private beliefs among private agents
and the corresponding updating of these beliefs according to the development of the economy. If7  Measuring Confidence 11
agents are either just “pessimistic” or “optimistic”, then there is no room for explaining the turning-
points in the business cycle.
The ICS (University of Michigan) is based also on the responses to five questions; “among the five
questions used to compile the index are two major components: One reflects consumer assessments
of current economic conditions; another focuses on expectations about the future” (Kinsey/Collins
1990, p. 206). Theses two components of the ICS “make up two separate indices called the index of
consumer expectations (ICE) and the index of current economic conditions (ICEC)” (ibid.). This
separation is an improvement, but still: How are expectations towards the future and the perception
of the present related to each other? In a rational expectations framework Kinsey and Collins (1990,
pp. 209-214) estimate the ICE as, among other things, a function of the ICEC. This procedure is, if
at all, only half way of explaining the disillusion of optimists/positive surprise of pessimists.
Notwithstanding these shortcomings, many of those papers come up basically with a correct mes-
sage: Not only is the state of the economy reflected in consumers' confidence, but also “consumer
sentiment causes fluctuations in GNP” (Matsusaka/Sbordone 1995, p. 297). Empirical investiga-
tions support the presumption that consumer confidence is positively (negatively) correlated with
good (bad) news from the real macro-economy (Delorme Jr. et al. 2001, p. 866). It can also be
shown that indicators of consumers' confidence do work as leading indicators for the change in the
consumption of goods (ibid., p. 868). There is also econometric evidence for the hypothesis that
“exogenous changes in consumer sentiment have real effects on output” (Matsusaka/Sbordone
1995, p. 317). Why this can be and how it can be, are key questions addressed in a different paper
(Sell 2002a).
7 Measuring  Confidence
This brings up the more general question how to “measure” trust or confidence. It seems as if the
recent paper by Glaeser et al. (2000) offers a view shared by the majority of the professionals
working in that area of research. However, how much “confidence” can we put into their methodo-
logical approach? As the authors say, “we measure trust … by conducting experiments with mone-
tary rewards” (ibid., p. 812). Then they regress returns from the experiments “on personal charac-
teristics of our subjects” (ibid., p. 839) and they compare these results with the outcome of surveys
(results from the National Opinion Research Centre’s General Social Survey, GSS). Following the
authors, “experiments measure preferences … much more convincingly than surveys, since experi-
ments provide direct observations of behaviour” (ibid., p. 841). Some econometric results (size, sign
and significance of estimated coefficients) don’t convince even the authors and they hypothesise
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to be quite a bit of danger – notwithstanding the brilliant and scrupulous methodological steps taken
by this group of researchers – to fall deeply into the Lucas-critique trap: not only is the experiment
situation quite different from the daily “yes-or-no putting trust into someone else” scenario, but also
the continuos novelty of trade-offs and decision making challenges is a constant and not an excep-
tion in our lives.
Therefore, as long as it proves difficult to observe economic behaviour under “normal circum-
stances”, the outcomes of experiments should be treated very carefully and one should be even
more cautious to interpret signals from experiments as measures of trust. National surveys, with all
their well known limitations, may well contain more robust information on the beliefs, hopes and
further sentiments of the people, such as the willingness to trust others. In the same vein, Alesina
and La Ferrara (2002) made use of the GSS survey (1974-1994) for their extensive and rigorous
econometric research on “who trusts”. They found three groups of variables which can “explain”
fairly well the propensity to trust: individual characteristics (education, income, etc.), belonging to
discriminated groups and thirdly the type of community where the agents live (income inequality,
mobility, etc.).
Zak and Knack (2001, p. 306) have based their empirical research on the trust phenomenon on data
from the World Values Surveys (WVS). The measure of trust used is almost identical to the GGS
survey: the percentage of respondents in “each country agreeing that most people can be trusted
against the alternative that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people (ibid.). In this sample,
there are data available from 41 market economies in three waves (1981, 1990/91, 1995/96).
8  Confidence as a Consumer Good
We would “jump too short” if we were satisfied to accept the above identification of confidence as
a capital good. Our everyday language, which after all does nothing else but reflect our treatment of
goods created and/or cultivated by human beings – thus reflecting “culture” – helps us here, too: A
known phrase that we use, for example, is that we “enjoy” somebody's confidence. As understood
by economists, this makes confidence a consumer good. This is a clear (and further) indication that
such specifications of benefit functions that are merely relating to material goods are highly incom-
plete at least. We have known this already from those cases of “do-gooders” who, while ever will-
ing to make a donation, are not only concerned with the well-being of others but just as well with
their contentment about their own, generous actions.
Confidence as a capital good and a consumer good? As we know, the classical world had far less
difficulties with considering one and the same item as a consumer or as a capital good, depending9  On the Onset of Confidence 13
on how it was used (we just have to think of grain in David Ricardo's explanation on the economic
surplus of agriculturally used areas). In principle, a consumer good may be privately or publically
owned. In the internal activities of a business enterprise or between business partners, the wording
cited above expresses somebody's contentment as to the fact that he has direct, uncomplicated, even
“confidential” access to (or dealings with) his counterpart or superior, which other individuals in his
environment do not have in this form. Therefore, it is a special, “exclusive” consumer good, and as
such a purely private one. The social character which confidence might also take on – admittedly,
as a capital and not as a consumer good – will be discussed at a later stage.
Does confidence diminish the more you use it? In other words: does the consumption of confidence
lead to its erosion? Not at all, or putting things more cautiously: hardly so, if you treat it carefully.
In this respect, we are reminded of the widows in a Bible story who use a jug to fetch water from
the well without ever using up all the available water (Sell 1991, p. 352).
4 An early example of the
modern concept of sustainability! As opposed to long-lived consumer items, confidence is not nec-
essarily subject to wear and tear. It can, however, be “gambled away”. This can happen because of
even the most minor breach of trust, by a breach of loyalty or faith, etc. Having said this, we may
also state that while the process of building up (and later on enjoying) confidence can be quite time
consuming, confidence may fade away in an instant.
9  On the Onset of Confidence
As Berg et al. (1995, p. 124) have correctly stated, the majority of contributions to the trust phe-
nomenon are quite weak when it comes to explain why and when confidence emerges in the first
place and/or whether “trust will exist absent repeated interactions” (ibid.). This finding is surprising,
though. Because daily business life – perhaps more than “Room A/Room B-experiments” – offers a
bunch of observations which can help to understand the inherent process(es). Take the case of the
ferry cruising between the island of Jurèia (Porto do Prelado) and the mainland in Brazil, which
serves to grasp some aspects of mistrust instead of initial and “sustainable” trust: the passengers pay
for the two passages only on their way back from the island, that is during the second part of the
trip. This comes as a signal of mistrust and not of confidence: only then they can be “sure” that the
ferry will take them back. The “confidence” put in the passengers by the company running the ferry
is no trust either, because the ferry is the only possibility of return to the passengers. Here we have a
nicely designed self-enforceable contract in an environment of mistrust. It works perfectly among
other things because of the lack of alternatives. And it functions without a formalised contract.
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sengers would pay in advance – other things being equal – then they would place unilaterally trust
in the ferry company indeed. Usually, trust or likewise confidence can only be explained in a more
sophisticated context. The majority of business transactions, as is well known, occur in a world of
different islands – very much in the vein of E. S. Phelps’ famous parabola – and not between an
island and the mainland. Also, there is an “exchange” of reciprocal demands/needs with more than
one transaction or service involved.
Suppose there is just one ferry and the ferryman (F), domiciled in island A, happens to have just one
passenger in the morning, a salesman (S). Assume S has no cash at all to pay the transport, but that
he can leave his car on island A as a sort of deposit. For F there is not enough time to verify the
value of the car before the trip. The intention of S is to make a deal (D) on island B which should
enable him to pay for his trip on his way back. There are no more islands and no more ferries within
reach. In principle, the ferryman has a moral hazard problem as the salesman might feel the oppor-
tunity to cheat (see Zak/Knack 2001, p. 297) the ferryman. He does not know a-priori whether S
possibly has the option to stay, at least for some time, on island B. Nor can he be sure that the car is
no lemon and that the deal D will be profitable. Will F ever go for a trip to island B and hence be-
come a creditor to S in the first place? Which alternatives does he have?
(i)  The first calculus F can make is to assess whether the selling price of the car (p) can cover
the costs of transport from A to B and from B to A. Most likely, it will. F always has the
choice to go back to A and to sell the car. This inspection, however, is costly and time con-
suming. He will then only come back to island B to pick up S if the realised selling price p
(net of transaction costs) did at least cover the costs of the first travel (from A to B and from
B to A). If F realises (or better: anticipates) a selling price of p (net of transaction costs)
above the travel costs from A to B and from B to A, he has an argument for himself to put
trust in S with regard to the success of D. Then, it makes sense to save time and costs and to
avoid the verification of the selling price p. Participating in the net revenues of D
5 – making
the simple assumption of no further passengers – most likely pays for the trip. For S it is im-
portant to anticipate that F will trust him. Otherwise he cannot reap the benefits of the deal
(which can only be realised on island A, an information which is private and not disclosed to
the ferryman) nor has he the chance to make further deals as long as he is “locked in” island
B. F could “abuse” from its resource monopoly (the ferry) and leave S alone on island B.
                                                                                                                                                                 
4  “Trust, like other moral resources, grows with use and decays, with disuse” (Dasgupta 1988, p. 56).
5  If F is risk-averse, he will prefer to be paid from the net revenues of D at least the ordinary fare price. If, however, F
is not risk-averse, he may prefer to be paid a constant share of the D revenues. Notice that F has now the typical
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But then, no profitable arrangements with S can occur in the future. We learn: credible an-
nouncements give rise to mutual trust. But there are more alternatives.
(ii)  Suppose F decides to stay at the port of island B and to wait for S. Whether F takes such a
decision is uncertain for S ex-ante. Therefore, the calculus concerning p and the travelling
costs still holds. But waiting for S is no free lunch for F: now we consider the opportunity
costs stemming from the foregone earnings of another trip from A to B and from B to A
with passengers P. The decision to wait is only profitable if the expected share of D (the op-
tion is waiting) – suppose the expected share declines for F through time because the time S
would have to wait for him represent opportunity costs in the sense of preparing a second
deal – exceeds the net revenues from a second trip with P and from the reduced share of D
(the option is transporting P). Here, some additional trust in the capabilities of S (he is able
to sign contracts and seal deals quickly) is needed. We learn: signalling correct assessments
of market values gives rise to further trust.
(iii)  F decides from the very start to make many, at least two trips, that is to keep his business
running. Suppose that he sells the car, once back from his first trip, as he comes back to A
for new passengers anyway. He has initially earnings of p minus the corresponding travel
costs. If S knows that the ferry will go on travelling in any case, we possibly have a different
calculus than above: now the selling price p may well fall below the costs of a single trip
from A to B and back to A. Because if D is successful, S can try to “compensate” for the
low selling price p with a sufficient large share of D. However, S bears the risk of being ex-
propriated by F (as he wants to come back to A), if the selling p showed to be comparatively
low. Here we see that a prohibitive high compensation payment can be the cost of misusing
the trust of someone else. Or, put it otherwise: honouring trust saves transaction costs (Ale-
sina/La Ferrara 2002, p. 207). Yet, F could again “abuse” from the fact that S is “locked in”
the island and ask for an unfair share of D even when the selling price of p covered his ex-
penses. Building up confidence between two parties, hence, may imply to renounce on the
temptation to “extract” additional profits from a business partner who is “locked in” or in a
classical “hold up” situation (Richter/Furubotn 1999, pp. 93/150). This insight has also been
gained in recent contributions of evolutionary game theory when explaining the paradoxical
outcomes of ultimatum-game experiments (Güth et al. 1982, pp. 367-388 and Güth et al.
2000, pp. 83-110).
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•  In “the sense of correct expectations about the actions of other people that have a bearing on
one’s own choice of action
•  when that action must be chosen before one can monitor the actions of those others.”
Our “story” moreover satisfies the 4 conditions set by Berg et al. (1995, p. 126) for the onset of
trust:
•  both agents (ferryman, salesman) are looking for positive profits;
•  placing trust in the trustee puts the trustor at risk (notice that the two agents are both trustor and
trustee at different stages in our example);
•  the trustee’s decision benefits the trustor at a cost to the trustee (dito);
•  both trustor and trustee are made better off from the transactions compared to the outcome
which would have occurred if the trustor had not entrusted the trustee.
and finally Zak’s and Knack’s definition of trust in a society according to which it
•  “can be defined as the aggregate time that agents do not spend in verifying other’s actions”
(ibid., p. 303).
10  Confidence and Economic Growth
The existence of an additional accumulable production factor “confidence” of the type described
contributes positively to economic growth; this, too, conversely seen, is an explanation for the poor
performance of former Socialist planned economies, which were systems of permanent suspicion,
control and mutual distrust
6. Like any accumulable production factor, confidence may be subject to
a writeoff process: The capital of confidence may very quickly erode if somebody “abuses our con-
fidence”, proves to be “unworthy” of our confidence or, conversely, if we “lose” our business part-
ner's confidence.
Write-offs may also be only moderate, such as when our counterpart does no longer have our “full
confidence”, when we choose to “trust him only so far”, that is, if what we have in him is “limited
confidence”. Thus, confidence is by no means a binary variable (all or nothing), as is sometimes
suggested. Or, as Zak and Knack put it, “there are degrees of trust” (2001, p. 298). These “limited
forms” of confidence function like systems of self-protection. In the case of an erosion of confi-
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If we consider confidence to be a production factor, its contribution to economic growth becomes
readily evident. In substitutional production functions, the existence of a production factor helps us
to economise on other resources. Insofar, the visual depth of transaction cost economics is not big
enough as far as the phenomenon of confidence is concerned. What is saved – if the confidence is
there – is not only the transaction cost but cost as such in the conventional sense of the consumption
of resources which are valued at factor prices. Confidence can be a substitute for employing legal
departments, or at least our “in-house attorney” (at least to some degree) as well as for “monitor-
ing”; it can reduce the cost for communications and transport, and it can make insurances and the
arranging of contracts redundant, etc. And, as Zak and Knack (2001, p. 296) have so convincingly
explored, it reduces the hours spent investigating one’s broker to whom we have delivered our
monetary wealth for financial investments.
It is also possible that confidence may only contribute to the output if it exists in fixed portions in
relation to other production factors. In that case, it may quickly develop into a bottleneck factor for
economic growth. Unless confidence is available in sufficient quantities, production will not be
taken up at all or will remain below a profitable level.
Fukuyama (1995, p. 196, footnote 5) pointed to another important contribution that confidence
makes to growth and which refers to a society's preparedness and eagerness to be innovative: If all
the employees of an industrial sector are not much willing to have confidence and are distrustful,
especially so with regard to innovations “because they fear these innovations might be used to their
disadvantage” (Blümle/Schoser 2002, p. 278), this will cause a tendency to delay or even hinder
technological progress. Now, the theory of finance tells us that risk avoidance is a quite rational
behaviour. If looking out also involves looking ahead, a risk-averting strategy may well consist in
seeking to improve one's own qualifications as early as possible so as to be able to meet the future,
more stringent demands of one's job.
The following statement applies to work relations in a modern business enterprise: “The network
economy is based on technology but can be established only on relationships. It starts with chips
and ends with confidence” (Kelly 1999, p. 190). Among other things, this is caused by the fact that
the new technologies require extreme specialisation. This necessitates an efficient self-organisation
on the one hand and the ability to communicate and have confidence on the other. Confidence be-
comes the very precondition for the successful development of new technologies (Blümle/Schoser
2002, p. 267).
                                                                                                                                                                 
6  “At the beginning of the transformation process, people had so little faith in the future that everyone took whatever
he could get hold of: Everybody believed that the others would take away the glass panes from the greenhouse - and
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The empirical research undertaken by Zak and Knack (2001, pp. 307-311) shows that the assumed
growth effects of trust can be detected econometrically: in their results, “growth rises by nearly 1
percentage point on average for each 15-percentage point increase in trust” (ibid., p. 309). Con-
versely, “if trust is sufficiently low, growth stalls” (ibid., p. 311). They also found that institutions
“affect growth via their impact on trust” (ibid., p. 297). This aspects points at the urgent need for the
new institutional economics do devote high and even more attention than until now to the trust phe-
nomenon.
11  Confidence and the Distribution of Income
A number of papers, for which the contributions of Knack (2000) and Knack and Keefer (1997) can
serve as good examples, tend to demonstrate econometrically that there is a negative impact from
inequality of income distribution on “trust”, no matter how measured the latter. Knack and Keefer
(1997, p. 1282) regressed trust on income inequality, measured by the Gini index: “the Gini coeffi-
cient for income inequality is strongly associated with lower trust” (ibid.). Knack finds that each 4-
point rise in the Gini index of income is associated with a 1-point drop in the social capital index
(ibid., p. 30). The social capital index in turn was created by taking the mean of three standardised
(to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one) variables. The first of these is a proxy for
trust: “the percentage of a state’s survey respondents who agree with the statement that ‘most peo-
ple are honest’ ”(ibid., pp. 9/10).
But, letting enter the Gini coefficient as a linear variable in a regression equation ‘explaining’ trust
as a part of a “social capital index” is by no means straightforward. The reason for that is easily told
(cf. Blümle/Sell 1998, pp. 337/338): suppose you find yourself back in the “real socialism model”
of the Soviet Union and its satellites. Where effective, the system had the tendency to bring the Gini
index down to sometimes extraordinary low levels, in comparison to market economies. As a result,
a climate of envy and distrust (‘hell on earth’) could be observed, which was not surprising at all,
given the obvious dispersion in the distribution of skills and capabilities in any population. There-
fore, the variable of the Gini index should be related to the trust phenomenon, albeit in a non-linear,
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12  Confidence and the Business Cycle
As has been described above and as is also to be found in other languages – “that particular form of
confidence known as credit – the effective belief in the business trustworthiness
7 and ability of
other parties” (F. Lavington 1925, p. 63) – the most fitting image of confidence as a flow is that of
an advance payment, that is, a credit. Since, however, confidence (as a stock) can last only if it is
mutual, we may well picture it as a network of reciprocal credit relations. This reciprocity is also,
and very much so, the factor which reduces the risk for the investors involved. Instead of falling
back on securities, creditors may “put up” debts of their own. If the confidence one had so far is
shaken or even shattered, this occurrence will have the tendency to cause a breakup of the credit
relations described and, in the worst case, will result in a cumulative wave of cancellations of mu-
tual credits which in turn causes a severe economic contraction. Loss of confidence also makes it-
self felt in that there is less inclination to accept risks elsewhere (production, sales, financing).
Whenever the loss of confidence between agents and/or enterprises or between agents and institu-
tions becomes a general phenomenon, we may call this process “erosion of confidence”.
Conversely, an increased buildup of trusting business relations will easily cause an economic up-
swing and mobilise forces that enhance the willingness to take risks. This is the business-cycle as-
pect of the phenomenon of confidence.
13  Confidence as Social Capital
Let us turn now to a question frequently raised in literature, i.e. whether confidence is a certain form
of social capital. Robert Putnam (1997, p. 67) has defined social capital as “features of social or-
ganisation such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate co-ordination and co-operation
for mutual benefit”. Carter and Castillo (2002, p. 28) say that social capital enhances the “incentive
compatibility of non-contractual or legally unenforceable exchange” (ibid.).
If this is supposed to mean that confidence triggers positive external effects (external benefits) in a
society – and that the social capital of confidence is therefore always greater than the sum of all
individual confidence-based relations – then we may certainly agree to this statement. Also, the
concept according to Walter Eucken would apply, who argued that confidence is an element that
induces order in social market economies. Without confidence in the system, institutions are limited
in performing their tasks in a market economy. Confidence makes regulating superfluous in many
cases, especially so if we are faced with over-regulating. The diagnosis of “Eurosclerosis” pro-
                                                
7  “The problem of trust would not arise if it was common knowledge that we were (at all times, the author) all trust-
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nounced many years ago by Herbert Giersch is to no small degree a consequence of the lack of con-
fidence – including self-confidence – prevailing in our society.
Added to this is something else: A lack of confidence in a society may not only be regarded as a
lack of social capital as a potential additional production factor but it requires – according to Fuku-
yama's studies – “a strict hierarchy and exact controlling, which is an impediment to a dynamic
economy” (Blümle/Schoser 2002, p. 265). Accordingly, a lack of confidence (as social capital) in-
duces expenses for controlling at and between the various levels of hierarchy. In this sense, the lack
of confidence (as social capital) swallows up scarce resources which are then no longer available
for alternative uses, that is, economic growth. This argument put forward by Fukuyama has spread
widely, and certainly it is very plausible.
It needs amplification, though. For once, there are authors who restrict or qualify the “enmity to-
wards confidence shown by hierarchies”. For example, Blümle (2002, p. 8) argues that “hierar-
chies” do in a way protect the individual because they are based on the principle of order, thus
making cooperation possible and, to some degree, allowing confidence to develop. But also this
argument has to be extended further to fully understand its dimensions. Admittedly, employees with
lower/medium qualification don’t feel unhappy with the control of their performance by their su-
pervisors in the first place. The more and the more often their performance is qualified as good or
even as excellent, the sooner their self-confidence  will grow. At the pace at which their self-
confidence increases, they will be willing to be more responsible for their actions and decisions.
Hence, they become prepared for organizational structures which are less hierarchical and more
based on mutual confidence.
On the other hand, hierarchies do not only have the effect described by Fukuyama but in a very
general way make a society less permeable. If, however, permeability signals to individuals that
they have the opportunity to advance (more) rapidly, it is in any case a stimulant for performance
and, in this way, for potentially higher economic growth. Studies on the differences between the
political parties in the USA and on the European continent have confirmed that in our system – es-
pecially in the social-democratic parties, which have long-standing traditions – you need to “work
your way up through the ranks” to assume positions of importance in the party and in government
(Hennis, 1998). It is obvious that such framework conditions do have a negative-selection effect as
to the range of people who are willing to assume political tasks. This negative-selection effect pre-
vents the “best qualified” in a society – as the philosophers of antiquity so vehemently demanded –
from tending to the political affairs of their own country, and – logically – dampens the effectivity
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Can social capital be “measured”? And if so, how? We have outlined above the way Knack (2000)
has created a “social capital index” drawing on a proxy for “interpersonal trust” (ibid., p. 9) which
was complemented by indicators reflecting “civic responsibility” (ibid., p. 10) and “ volunteer ac-
tivity” (ibid., p. 11). Ideally, social capital should measure the “level of non-legal enforcement
within a community, as … people living in areas with high social capital have a lot of opportunities
of “punishing” a person who abuses their trust” (Guiso et al. 2001, p. 28). Also, an index should be
able to capture the extent to which a community has internalised its own norms and expects the in-
dividuals as part of the community to behave accordingly;, then, it could well serve as a proxy for
social capital (ibid.).
14  The Lack and Erosion of Confidence within, between and towards
Business Enterprises and their Managers
As the contributions of Fukuyama (1995), La Porta et al. (1997) and of other authors have impres-
sively shown, “trust is most needed to support co-operation in large organisations, where members
interact with each other only infrequently because they are only rarely involved in joint production”
(La Porta et al., p. 333). Empirical evidence is strong for the argument that the performance of large
organisations (governments, firms, civic organisations) benefits from the existence of trust. Moreo-
ver, “trust facilitates all large-scale activities” (ibid., p. 335).
In analogy to the statements made above, a lack of confidence within a business enterprise will very
likely have consequences for the company's levels of hierarchy. It is not only the organisation
within given forms of businesses that changes with the degree of existing confidence, but even
more: the form of the business enterprise itself becomes an endogenous factor depending on the
existence or non-existence of confidence. As a tendency, a considerable lack of confidence will lead
to a lack of large private-sector enterprises “in which informal conditions must be replaced by a
complex control structure and a feeling of belonging together” (Blümle/Schoser 2002, p. 265).
Mutatis mutandis, this applies also to the relations between business enterprises – be it subcontrac-
tors, producers of similar products or purchasers of one's own products. A lack of confidence will
drastically reduce the willingness to cooperate (more) closely and even the conceivable forming of
networks between various enterprises. Synergetic effects, which otherwise might be possible, do not
materialise or remain below a satisfactory level. Business enterprises frequently operate based on
mutual arrangements that are not laid down in writing, that is, which are based on mutual confi-
dence. Cartels  are just not a good example for this, and not only because arrangements between
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much more important: Cartels are hotbeds of distrust. Distrust towards one's partners which are sus-
pected to make clandestine sales beyond the agreed quota; towards potential newcomers who pose a
threat to the cartel price; towards the fair-trade commission which seeks to uncover the cartel's
subterfuges, etc.
Confidence in business enterprises may be seen from various “external perspectives”, such as those
of consumers, owners of capital, investors in general, creditors, and even the representatives of tax
authorities. Again, we should distinguish between “lack” and the erosion of confidence. The ero-
sion of confidence is not simply the consequence of a lack of confidence. On the contrary, it may
have been that employees, investors, etc. had been “too confident” vis-à-vis the actions of the man-
agement in certain companies.
Most recently, the confidence in the business managers of large industrial nations (in the USA these
are referred to as chief executive officers, or CEO for short) has been shaken considerably because
of various circumstances, including falsified balance statements of large US enterprises (Enron,
WorldCom, Adelphia); compensations that reached astronomical levels paid to the top managers of
businesses that were subjected to hostile takeovers (Mannesmann); significant increases in salaries
which executive boards granted to their members with the blessing of the control boards despite the
fact that stock prices were at an all-time low and hardly any dividends could be paid (Deutsche
Telekom); insider deals in the stock market made by managers who had privileged access to infor-
mation (Ivan Boesky); exercising of options on the purchase of shares and selling at high price lev-
els which in part were based on fictitious profits (Samuelson 2002, p. 6) and, last but not least,
clandestine pension payments made to top managers, with the interest payments frequently ex-
ceeding by far the usual interest rates of the market.
According to a study conducted by Stanford University there were 327 criminal proceedings initi-
ated as early as 2001 against business managers in the USA, which constitutes a 60 per cent in-
crease over the previous year. Experts estimate that this number will again rise considerably in
2002. Meanwhile, legislators in the USA have responded and demand, among other measures, that
executive boards (Heilmann et al. 2002, p. 2) should swear to the accuracy of balance statements.
Furthermore, there is increasing pressure put on SEC (the USA's stock exchange commission) to
provide for a transparent set of rules, including “transparent pockets” of top managers.
Jeffrey Immelt, the successor of Jack Welch, attributed the scandal which occurred at GE and other
large US companies to “half-baked business models” and a “miserable corporate culture” (ibidem).
This statement sort of “proves” our initial observation that confidence is taken as part of the “corpo-
rate culture” in market economies. If we think of confidence as an important element of corporate15  Summary and Outlook 23
culture, we might consider the second reason cited by Immelt to be nothing but a “breach of trust”
committed against shareholders, tax authorities, etc. The scandals mentioned have destroyed a lot of
confidence in terms of social capital 
8. This is what the term “erosion of confidence” tends to ex-
press. The economies affected now have less resources than before, and this at a time when the eco-
nomic trend worldwide has hit rock bottom.
15  Summary and Outlook
In this text we have tried to throw a light on the various economic dimensions of confidence. In
doing so, it is important to distinguish between confidence as an object of experience and confi-
dence as an object of recognition. Listening and observing will help the economist in approaching
the “content” of confidence. This content may be tracked down both on the level of individual
economies and that of overall economy. From the author's perspective, confidence is a versatile
item which results from investments and becomes a production factor on the one hand, but which
can also be a consumer item on the other.
Confidence and optimism are terms often confused. When, for example, research institutes report
on the climate of the economy, they draw, among other things, on indices of “consumer confidence”
when actually they are interested in the prevailing optimism or pessimism among consumers. As
opposed to this, recent empirical contributions on the confidence/trust phenomenon have presented
convincing data sets based on national surveys and extraordinarily interesting results from their
econometric research.
The explanation of the onset of confidence between two individuals is a question not addressed in
many papers, notwithstanding its clear importance and relevance for the matter. In our paper, we
have extended a real “island – mainland” story from Brazil to a virtual scenario of two agents and
two islands. In this setting, it can be shown that it is the “appetite” for additional earnings which lets
the agents engage with and “trust” each other. The parabola also serves to verify the hypothesis that
confidence can be “measured” as the time saved for investigation activities.
The contributions to the order of economy, to the business cycle and to growth which come from
confidence as a both company-specific and social production factor (“social capital”) must not be
underestimated. Generally, an increase in confidence goes along with greater governmental and
social efficiency (La Porta et al. 1997, p. 336). Even today, “confidence” – understood as social
capital – between the acting parties (Blümle/Schoser 2002, p. 282) in different economic regions is
                                                
8  “The new ethical problems arise from the fact that investors and employees are tempted into accepting risks which
they have not understood and in part have not knowingly accepted. … This has created a moral vacuum that doesConfidence and the Erosion of Confidence 24
even considered as an important factor for positioning oneself in the locational competition which
globalisation has fostered so much.
As is demonstrated by the scandals of the formerly flourishing “New Economy”, the abuse of con-
fidence is often sanctioned by introducing or tightening control systems and, for the time being, by
greater distrust on the part of the individuals. There is a considerable risk that distrust spreads
throughout the economy and finally leads to the erosion of confidence. The price to be paid by soci-
ety tends to be high as it is a long and costly project to reinstall confidence in the economy as social
capital.
Reversing the argument, that is, inferring that confidence makes control mechanisms (and thus, in-
directly, some sort of distrust as well) superfluous if there is confidence in individuals and in soci-
ety, is something that perhaps should best be avoided. Complex systems like modern service socie-
ties and democracies can probably not go without a certain measure of “institutionalised distrust”
(Blümle 2002, p. 13) – which also serves as a protective wall against taking risks that are too great
(ibidem). Democracy, perhaps, is a good example how to organize “institutionalized distrust” vis-à-
vis to politicians.
The “ruse” applied by the writers of wise constitutions and legislations that are workable (for the
state as a whole but also for the economic sector and for civic activities) possibly consists in the fact
that for those very situations where confidence has been abused by politicians or individuals in the
economic field a solution or a “way out” is formulated which is both practical (sanctions are taken
against misbehaviour) and does not question the social context and the social capital as a whole.
                                                                                                                                                                 
not draw a clear line between acceptable and unacceptable risk” (Seifert/Voth 2002, p. 8).Bibliography
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